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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890346-CA

v.
Category No. 2

EDWARD DAY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of a motion for new trial.
Defendant was convicted of rape, a first degree felony, after a
non-jury trial in the Seventh Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's

request for a continuance on his motion for new trial?
2.

Whether defendant is precluded from claiming that

he was denied counsel on his motion for new trial where he failed
to request counsel?
3. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion for new trial as untimely and unsupported?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant provisions relied upon the State are
properly set forth in the argument section of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with rape, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1989) (R. 2),
Defendant was convicted as charged after a non-jury trial held
September 15-16, 1989, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in
and for San Juan County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, Judge, presiding (R. 27-29, T. 1). Judge Bunnell
sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah
State Prison (R. 39).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 4, 1987, Tanya Wyatt attended a high school
graduation party held at Kens Lake near Moab, Utah (T. 7).
Defendant was also in attendance at the party (T. 181). In the
early morning hours of June 5, 1987, defendant pursued Wyatt to a
secluded area, held her to the ground, threatened to drown her,
and forced sexual intercourse (T. 22-23, 193-96).

During the

attack, she screamed "rape," but defendant put his hand over her
mouth and told her to "shut up" (T. 41). Wyatt persuaded
defendant to stop by suggesting that it would be more comfortable
at her house (T. 24, 195-96).

Upon returning to the area of the

party, Wyatt immediately exclaimed to others that defendant had
raped her (T. 24-25, 56-57, 59, 68).
Defendant was arrested and charged with the rape (T.
124, R. 2). At a bench trial held on September 15-16, 1987,
defendant claimed that Wyatt consented to sexual intercourse and
The trial transcripts will be referred to as HT.M The
transcript on the motion for new trial will be referred to as
"N.T." (See Appendix A; motion for new trial transcript).

that Wyatt had acted in a sexually provocative manner at the
party (T. 157-60, 164-65, 174, 192). After two days of trial,
Judge Bunnell found defendant guilty of rape (R. 27-29, T. 142,
244, 245, 257). Defendant did not appeal his conviction (Br. of
App. at 13).
More than a year later, on October 20, 1988, defendant
filed a pro se motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence (R. 48). The State responded that defendant failed to
file his motion for new trial within ten days of his sentence or
support his motion with affidavits or evidence (R. 50-52).

At a

hearing held on November 10, 1988, Judge Bunnell denied
defendant's motion as untimely and unsupported (R. 53, 56, T. 23).

Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion for new trial

(R. 58).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's request for
a continuance of his motion for new trial.

Defendant supplies no

relevant legal authority for his position that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his request.

In any event,

because defendant's motion was fatally out of time, it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny defendant's request to continue the
motion.
Nor did the trial court err by not appointing counsel
sua sponte to assist defendant in his motion for a new trial.
Defendant failed to request counsel in the trial court below.
Therefore, he cannot raise the issue for the first time on
appeal.

Regardless, Judge Bunnell had no duty or obligation to

divine defendant's need for counsel.

Defendant was not entitled

to court appointed counsel and proceeded to represent himself
without any indication that he desired counsel.
Finally, the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the
motion was out of time and unsupported.

Rule 24 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure requires a motion for new trial to be filed
within ten (10) days after imposition of sentence.

The rule

further requires that such a motion be accompanied by supporting
affidavits or evidence.

In this case, defendant's motion was

more than one year late and was unsupported by affidavits or
evidence.

In any event, defendant's claim of newly discovered

evidence did not warrant a new trial where it merely consisted of
cumulative impeachment evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE OF HIS MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL.
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant's request for a continuance of
his motion for new trial.

Defendant's claim should be rejected.

It first must be noted that defendant cites no legal
authority for his claim other than the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 3(a)(4), and Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In the absence of relevant legal authority, defendant's claim
should not be considered.
(Utah 1984) .

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344

In any event, the Utah Supreme Court has set forth the
standard of review from a trial court's denial of a continuance.
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982).

In Creviston, the

Supreme Court stated:
It is well established in Utah, as
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance
is at the discretion of the trial judge,
whose decision will not be reversed by this
Court absent a clear abuse of that
discretion. . . .
Id. at 752 (citations omitted).

See also State v. Williams, 712

P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, Judge Bunnell denied defendant's
motion for new trial as not timely filed as required by Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Because defendant's

motion for new trial was fatally belated, it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny defendant's request to continue the motion.
Additional time could not cure the defect of untimeliness.
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL FOR HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,
DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to appoint counsel defendant in his motion for new trial (Br. of
App. at 11). Defendant's claim is frivolous.
It is well-established that this Court will not
consider an issue on appeal which was not raised in the lower
court and preserved for appeal.

Floyd v. Western Surgical

Assoc., Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983).

A defendant must afford

the trial court an opportunity to correct any error at the lower
level.

See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1988).

Defendant admits that he did not request assistance of counsel
for his motion for new trial.

Accordingly, this Court should not

consider defendant's unpreserved claim.
In an attempt to circumvent the requirement of
preservation, defendant argues that the trial court should have
perceived his need for counsel and appointed counsel sua sponte.
Defendant concedes that he is not constitutionally entitled to
appointed counsel in discretionary matters, but maintains that
principles of due process mandated Judge Bunnell to appoint
counsel sua sponte.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a
criminal defendant's right to counsel in a first appeal after a
conviction.

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).

In

fact, the Court has disfavored schemes which prevent an indigent
defendant's access to the courts.

See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372

U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

However, the Court has

refused to mandate counsel in discretionary actions.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).

Ross v.

Under Utah law, an indigent

defendant is clearly not entitled to appointed counsel in
discretionary proceedings.

Utah Code Ann. S§ 77-32-1(5) (Supp.

1989) and 77-32-3(b) (1982).
The Court has further declared that a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to act as his own counsel.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); McKaskle v. Wiggins,

465 U.S. 168 (1984); But see State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1248 (Utah 1988), aff'd on reconsideration 776 P.2d 631 (Utah
1989).

It is not the judge's duty or obligation to trample on a

defendant's right to self-representation and force a defendant to
accept counsel.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.

In the present case, defendant failed to afford himself
of the opportunity to seek a timely motion for new trial or to
directly appeal his conviction and sentence.

Undoubtedly,

defendant had the right to assistance of counsel had he sought a
direct appeal from his conviction or a timely motion for new
trial.

Instead, defendant filed a motion for new trial more than

a year beyond the time limit.

The motion was signed by defendant

and was not accompanied by a motion to appoint counsel.

At the

hearing on defendant's motion, defendant did not indicate to the
trial judge that he requested that assistance of counsel.
Defendant argued his motion, which was denied as untimely.
Subsequently, defendant filed a notice of appeal accompanied by a
motion to appoint counsel on appeal.
Under the circumstances described above, Judge Bunnell
had no duty or obligation to appoint legal counsel sua sponte.
Notably, defendant makes no reference to relevant legal authority
in support of his bald claim.

He simply claims, without support,

that Judge Bunnell should have divined his need for counsel based
on the insufficiency of his motion and arguments.

Defendant

ignores the procedural defect of untimeliness which could not
have been cured by appointment of counsel.

Furthermore, his late

motion amounted to a discretionary action for which, as discussed
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above, he was not entitled to appointed counsel (even if he could
demonstrate indigence).

Accordingly, Judge Bunnell did not err

by failing to appoint counsel for defendant sua sponte.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant claims that the trial judge abused his
discretion in denying defendant's motion for new trial.
Defendant's claim must fail.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a party may move for a new trial as follows:
Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for new trial shall be made in
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the
essential facts in support of the motion. If
additional time is required to procure
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after imposition of sentence,
or within such further time as the court may
fix during the ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party
shall be in the same position as if no trial
had been held and the former verdict shall
not be used or mentioned either in evidence
or in argument.
(Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, the trial court denied

defendant's motion for new trial on two procedural grounds:

(1)

defendant's motion was not filed within ten (10) days of
sentence, and (2) defendant's motion was unsupported by
affidavits or evidence sufficient to establish "good cause" for a

new trial (R. 56). For either or both reasons, the trial court
properly denied defendant's motion.
A.

Defendant's Motion For New Trial Was Untimely.

Recently, this Court reiterated the procedural
requirement that a "Rule 24 motion for new trial must be filed
'within ten days after imposition of sentence.'"

State v.

Johnson, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 10/30/89)
(quoting Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure).

In Johnson,

this Court found the State's motion for new trial untimely where
it was filed twelve (12) days after the order of dismissal.

This

is in accord with the plain language of the rule which provides
no exceptions for untimeliness, unless an extension of time is
granted within the ten days.
In the present case, defendant was sentenced by Judge
Bunnell on October 6, 1987 (R. 39-40).

On October 20, 1988,

defendant filed his motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence (R. 48). Plainly, defendant's motion was
procedurally belated more than one year.

Thus, based solely on

untimeliness, Judge Bunnell properly denied defendant's motion.
B.

Defendant's Motion For New Trial Was Unsupported.

It is well-settled that "[i]t is a matter solely within
the discretion of the trial court as to whether it should grant a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence."

State v.

Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d 438, 439 (1973); see also State
v. Bundy, 589 P.2d 760 (Utah 1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 926
(1979).

The determination to deny a motion for a new trial based

on a newly discovered evidence claim "will not be reversed absent
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a clear abuse of that discretion."

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d

220, 220 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah
1983)).

Evaluations of the trial court's discretion will only

occur in "instances where there is a grave suspicion that justice
may have been miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on
a vital point, which the new evidence will supply."
P.2d at 439-40.

Harris, 513

See also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah

1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).
Further, it is generally held that newly discovered
impeachment evidence is insufficient to warrant a new trial.
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988); Moore v.
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. Myers, 534
F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

In Myers the court explained:

Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to
impeach the credibility of a prosecution
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to
justify a new trial, particularly when the
newly discovered evidence by would be "only
an additional part of a cumulative attack on
the witness' credibility."
Id. at 756 (citations omitted) (quoting United State v. Gilbert,
668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982)).
See also Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956).

To

obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must show:

(1) that the evidence is material and newly

discovered; (2) that using due diligence, the defendant could not
have discovered the evidence prior to trial; and (3) that the
evidence is substantial enough that, with it, there might have
been a different result.
(Utah 1980) .

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372

In the present case, a new trial was not warranted.
Without the required supporting affidavits or evidence, the trial
court could not determine whether defendant had established "good
cause" for a new trial.
Secondly, the nature of the new evidence was merely
cumulative impeachment evidence which is generally insufficient
to warrant a new trial.

Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851. At trial,

defendant claimed the victim had consented to intercourse and
offered testimony in support of his defense (T. 75, 157-60, 16465, 172-74, 192, 206-07).

In the absence of a recantation by the

victim, defendant's proffered testimony is merely cumulative
regarding the victim's credibility.
Finally, where defendant's motion was procedurally
untimely and insufficient, defendant cannot cure such defects by
demanding sua sponte relief from the trial court.

Defendant

cites no legal authority for his claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to act sua sponte.

The trial

court was not required to act on its own motion where defendant's
motion was procedurally defective.
It must be noted that defendant's failure to file a
timely motion for new trial does not leave him without a remedy.
Defendant may seek postconviction relief under Rule 65B(i), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.

To justify a release of a convicted person through the

means of postconviction relief, "the evidence of his innocence
must be stronger than would be necessary in the first instances
in support of a motion for new trial. . . . •• Ward v. Turner, 12
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Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72, 74 (1961), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 872
(1962).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that the
order of the lower court be affirmed.
DATED this

l

day of December, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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